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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:'

v.

:

Case No. 950337-CA

EDGARDO MENDOZA

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of
the Utah Court of Appeals under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d)
(Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Does the plaintiff's failure to marshal the evidence in

support of the trial court's findings of fact require this Court
to assume those findings to be correct?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

"The factual findings underlying the

trial court's conclusions will not be set aside unless they are
clearly erroneous."

State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah

App. 1995) (quoting State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah
1990).

See also Marshall v. Marshall. 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah

App. 1996); State v. Chavez. 840 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah App. 1992),
Certt denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
2.

Did the imposition of a "fine" by a prison disciplinary

hearing, for the purpose of recouping the costs of the hearing
and investigation in this matter, constitute punishment such that
the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution
prohibits the plaintiff's being charged with criminal misconduct
concerning the same incident?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The trial court's conclusions of law

are reviewed for correctness.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936

(Utah 1994); State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 39-40 (Utah App.
1995)
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend. V.
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process of law
and just compensation clauses]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land and naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation.
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Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-33 (1996) Restitution for offenses.
Following an administrative hearing, the department is
authorized to require restitution from an offender for expenses
incurred by the department as a result of the offender's
violation of department rules. The department is authorized to
require payment from the offender's account or to place a hold on
it to secure compliance with this section.
(While currently found'in the 1996 Replacement Volume, this
statute has remained the same since 1985)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 15, 1994, Edgardo Mendoza was charged, by
information, with Assault on a Correctional Officer, a Class A
Misdemeanor.

R. 1-2.

On February 27, 1995, the defendant filed

a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that this prosecution was barred by
his prior prison disciplinary hearing on the basis of double
jeopardy.

R. 21-3 0.

The motion was denied by the trial court, which entered its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on May 8, 1995. R. 58-61.
Mendoza filed a petition for permission to appeal this
interlocutory order on May 25, 1995. R. 76-87.

Permission was

granted by Order of June 22, 1995. R. 75.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On August 7, 1994, Mendoza is alleged to have assaulted a
correctional officer at the Utah State Prison by throwing a
3

substance, thought to be fecal matter and urine, at the officer.
R. 1-2.

This alleged misconduct also resulted in Mendoza being

disciplined by the Utah State Department of Corrections.

While

no actual evidence was presented by the defendant concerning the
prison disciplinary hearing, the State of Utah did not dispute
the claims made by Mendoza that the defendant had been found
guilty in the prison disciplinary of "Assault with Body Fluid"
and ordered to pay a $200.00 "fine" and serve 30 days of
"punitive isolation."

R. 22, 31.

The only evidence presented to the trial court was the
Affidavit of Terry Bartlett, the Director of Institutional
Operations for the Utah Department of Corrections.

R. 45-47.

In his affidavit, Mr. Bartlett testified that the fines
assessed in prison disciplinaries are "generally nominal (no more
than $200.00) and go towards reimbursing the prison the costs of
the hearing, including investigation costs when applicable.
Additional monetary amounts may be charged to the inmate to
reimburse the prison for property damage or related costs.

R.

46.
Mr. Bartlett also testified that such monetary judgments and
punitive isolation served "to encourage proper inmate behavior
and rehabilitate the inmate."

R. 46
4

The Utah State Department of Corrections has been expressly
authorized by statute to require offenders to pay restitution to
the Department for expenses incurred as a result of the
offenders' violation of department rules. Utah Code Ann. § 6413-33 (1996) (the actual language of the statute is unchanged
since 1985) .
In its findings of fact, the trial court expressly found
that the "fine" assessed against Mendoza, following a prison
disciplinary hearing, went towards "reimbursing the prison the
costs of the hearing, including investigation costs when
applicable."

R. 59-60.

The court also entered findings of fact

that such "fines" and punitive isolation served to "encourage
proper inmate behavior" and to rehabilitate inmates.

R. 60. A

further finding of fact by the trial court was that the "fine" of
$200.00 at issue in this action was not "grossly disproportionate
to the prison's remedial goals."

R. 60.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Having failed to marshal the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings, Mendoza cannot challenge the same and
this Court should assume that the findings are supported by the
record.

5

The $200 "fine" at question was remedial in nature.

It was

imposed to help pay for the administrative process that was
required in response to the plaintiff's violation of the prison's
rules.

No evidence was presented to. show that the amount of $200

was grossly disproportionate to the cost to the State of Utah of
holding such a hearing and investigating the misconduct of the
plaintiff.

The ordered restitution amount of $200 is allowed by

statute and approximates the actual costs of the State.
ARGUMENT
I. MENDOZA HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS OF FACT - WHICH SHOULD THEREFORE BE
ASSUMED SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD
In arguing that the imposition of a fine by a prison
disciplinary hearing constitutes punishment for double jeopardy
purposes, Mendoza has ignored the findings of fact entered by the
trial court.

The trial court expressly found that the "fine" in

this matter did no more than reimburse the state for the expenses
of the disciplinary hearing and the costs of investigation.

The

court also found that the monetary judgment served a remedial
purpose in promoting inmate rehabilitation and obedience to the
rules of the prison.

6

Mendoza presented no evidence in the trial court, he did not
oppose or in any manner seek to challenge the undisputed evidence
submitted in the trial court by the Utah Department of
Corrections.

He does not marshal the evidence in support of the

trial court's Findings of Facts in his opening brief.

Mendoza

>

does not seek to show in any manner that the evidence in the
record is insufficient to support the trial court's Findings of
Fact.

For this reason, this Court should assume that the record

supports the findings of the trial court.

Marshall v. Marshall.

915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1996) ("We will uphold the trial
court's findings of fact if a party fails to appropriately
marshal all of the evidence."); State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113,
1119 (Utah App. 1995).
Because Mendoza has not marshaled the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings of fact, and has not shown how the
evidence of record is insufficient to support the trial court's
factual findings, this Court should assume "that the record
supports the findings of the trial court" and proceed "to the
review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law
and the application of that law in the case."
806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991).

7

Saunders v. Sharp,

II. THE MONETARY JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST
MENDOZA BY THE PRISON DISCIPLINARY HEARING
WAS NOT PUNISHMENT FOR DOUBLE JEOPARDY
PURPOSES BECAUSE IT DID NO MORE THAN
COMPENSATE THE STATE FOR THE EXPENSES OF THE
HEARING AND ASSOCIATED INVESTIGATION
Mendoza's only claim on appeal is that the imposition of a
$200.00 sanction (for the purpose of reimbursing the state for
the expense of the disciplinary hearing and associated
investigation) constitutes punishment under the double jeopardy
clause of the United States Constitution, such that the present
criminal prosecution is barred.

Mendoza claims that any monetary

sanction imposed in a prison disciplinary hearing is punishment.
Defendant's claim fails because the imposition of a monetary
sanction that is roughly related to compensating the government
for its losses (including the costs of investigations and
proceedings) is remedial, and not punitive, in nature.
It is undisputed that the question before this Court is
whether the monetary sanction imposed on Mendoza rises to the
level of a multiple punishment for the same offense.

In United

States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), the United States Supreme
Court once again held that a civil fine could be either punitive
or remedial in nature.

The Court, reviewing its prior decisions

8

on this question, explained that a civil fine was remedial if it
sought to reimburse the government for its actual losses.
The relevant teaching of these cases is that
the Government is entitled to rough remedial
justice, that is, it may demand compensation
according to somewhat imprecise formulas,
such as reasonable liquidated damages or a
fixed sum plus double damages, without being
deemed to have imposed a second punishment
for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis.
These cases do not tell us, because the
problem was not presented in them, what the
Constitution commands when one of those
imprecise formulas authorizes a supposedly
remedial sanction that does not remotely
approximate the Government's damages and
actual costs, and rough justice becomes clear
injustice.
490 U.S. at 446.
Halper created a rule "for the rare case . . . where a
fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge
offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the
damages he has caused."

Id. at 449.

The rule is one of reason: Where a defendant
previously has sustained a criminal penalty
and the civil penalty sought in the
subsequent proceeding bears no rational
relation to the goal of compensating the
Government for its loss, but rather appears
to qualify as "punishment" in the plain
meaning of the word, then the defendant is
entitled to an accounting of the Government's
damages and costs to determine if the penalty
sought in fact constitutes a second
punishment.
9

Id. (footnote omitted).
In other words, the only proscription
established by our ruling is that the
Government may not criminally prosecute a
defendant, impose a criminal penalty upon
him, and then bring a separate civil action
based on the same conduct and receive a
judgment that is not rationally related to
the goal of making the government whole.
Id. at 451 (footnote omitted).
The fines in Halper were over $130,000 compared to less than
$16,000 in government expenses and only $585 in actual losses by
the government that had been shown.

The United States Supreme

Court remanded the matter to the trial court for an accounting of
the actual costs and ordered the trial court to permit the
government to recover its demonstrated costs.

Id. at 452.

The State of Utah agrees with the defendant that Halper
provides the correct test to use in this instance, even though
the civil proceeding in this case preceded the criminal
prosecution.
important.

The order in which the proceedings occur is not

United States v. Furlett. 974 F.2d 839, 843 n.2 (7th

Cir. 1992) .
Mendoza has never challenged the trial court!s finding of
fact that the "fine" of $200 in this action was meant to
reimburse the prison the cost of the disciplinary hearing and its

10

accompanying investigation and that it was not grossly
disproportionate to that goal.
Such a question is a factual issue, one that has been
resolved against Mendoza in the triaj. court.

United States v.

Mayers, 897 F.2d 1126, 1127 (11th Cir.), cert, denied. 498 U.S.
865 (1990).

Because Mendoza never challenged the amount of the

"fine" as being disproportionate to the government's losses, he
has failed to state a double jeopardy claim.
A defendant must make a threshold showing of
"punishment" before a court undertakes a
double jeopardy analysis. In the context of
a civil sanction, this threshold is met by
showing the sanction to be overwhelmingly
disproportionate to the government's damages
and expenses. Leeway is given to achieve
"rough justice" when computing the precise
amount of damages and costs the government
suffered. Only in the rare case where such
disproportion is shown does the burden of
accounting for its damages and costs fall on
the government.
United States v. Morgan. 51 F.3d 1105, 1115 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct. 171 (1995) (citations omitted).
In United States v. Barnette. 10 F.3d 1553 (11th Cir.),
cert, denied, 115 S.Ct. 74 (1994), the Court found that a
recovery that was slightly over three times the actual losses of
the government did not constitute a second punishment but was
still remedial in nature.
11

In United States v. Walker. 940 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1991),
the Court rejected a claim that a penalty of $500 for a customs
violation was a criminal punishment.

The defendant in Walker

claimed that the amount was excessive in that the customs check,
that led to the discovery of the contraband and the imposition of
the penalty, involved only one employee of the Customs Service
working for less than one hour.

In rejecting this claim, the

Court took judicial notice of the financial burden of the
associated with maintaining check points and administering the
customs system.

The Court found that the amount of the penalty

bore a rational relationship to the government's costs.
In United States v. McClinton. 98 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1996)
found a $1,000 penalty imposed for a second customs violation to
be remedial and not punitive in nature.
Sanders claims that because he was assessed
$1,000 that, surely, must make his assessment
a punishment. We do not agree. Our decision
in Walker applies just as clearly to a $1,000
civil penalty as it does to a $500 civil
penalty. Beyond that, Halper itself
indicated that no exact determination of
government costs is needed, for the
determination is unavoidably imprecise and
"inevitably involves an element of rough
justice." Indeed, the concern of the Court
in that case was that a multiplication of a
large number of civil penalties could add up
to punishment in a particular case.

12

In Halper, the government sought $2,000 plus
double damages for each of 65 separate false
claims. The overcharge in each of those
claims was about $9. But the Court was not
concerned at all about the fact that a mere
$9 overcharge could draw a $2,000 penalty
plus $18. It took that to be rationally
related to making the government whole. In
fact, lest it be misunderstood, the Court
added:
It hardly seems necessary to state that a
suit under the Act alleging one or two false
claims would satisfy the rationalrelationship requirement. It is only when a
sizeable number of false claims is present
that, as a practical matter, the issue of
double jeopardy may arise.
In other words, the Court meant what it said
when it said that the rule it was announcing
was "a rule for the rare case." This case is
not a rarity. Of course, this is not to say
that a single penalty can never be so
"overwhelmingly disproportionate" that it
constitutes punishment for double jeopardy
purposes. Again, this is not that case.
Id. at 1201 (citations omitted).
Nor is the present action that case.

The $200 restitution

imposed in this matter is more proportional than either of the
customs penalties upheld as remedial by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals.

Mendoza has never challenged the rationality of the

penalty!s relationship to the remedial goal of reimbursing the
State of Utah for its costs in the disciplinary hearing and its
related investigation.

The trial court's finding that the "fine"
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in question was not "grossly disproportionate to the prison's
remedial goals" (R. 60) should therefore be affirmed.
III. MENDOZA'S RELIANCE ON TESTS OTHER THAN
THAT ESTABLISHED IN HALPER IS ERRONEOUS
Mendoza presents this Court with numerous tests as to what
is or is not punishment.

The only test that is applicable to

this case is that laid down by the United States Supreme Court in
Halper. that was addressed in the prior argument.

The

defendant's reliance on these other tests is erroneous.
Austin v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2801 (1993), was not even
a double jeopardy case.

Instead, it involved the question of

whether a civil in rem forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on excessive fines.

The Court expressly rejected the

use of the Halper standard because of the differences in the two
situations.

Id. at 2812 n.14.

Austin did not alter the Halper

test, but rather simply cited Halper for the proposition that
civil penalties can be punitive in nature.
test set out in Austin i s

not

Id. at 2806.

The

useful to this Court.

The same is true of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
State v. a House & 1.37 Acres of Real Property. 886 P.2d 534
(Utah 1994) . House did not seek to alter the Halper double

14

jeopardy test, but only implemented the guidelines of Austin in
an action concerning a civil in rem forfeiture.
Nor is the test created in Dep't of Revenue of Montana v.
Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. 1937 (1994) applicable.

The Court

expressly stated that "Halpey's method of determining whether the
exaction was remedial or punitive

f

simply does not work in the

case of a tax statute.1" and proceeded to create a different
standard.

Id. at 1948.

The test established by this Court in State v. Arbon, 909
P.2d 1270 (Utah App. 1996) is also not applicable.

Arbon, set

out a test for whether an administrative license suspension was
punishment.

This Court expressly rejected a strict application

of Halper because its test for monetary sanctions was not
appropriate.

But in the present action, the question is one of a

monetary sanction, and not an administrative license suspension.
Mendoza's reliance on State v. Davis, 903 P.2d 940 (Utah
App. 1995), cert, granted, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996), is also
misplaced.

Davis followed the erroneous decision of the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. $405,089.23 U.S.
Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), rev!d. United States v.
Ursery. 116 S.Ct. 2135 (1996).

The Ninth Circuitfs opinion was

consolidated with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in
15

United States v. Ursery. 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd. 116
S.Ct. 2135 (1996), for purposes of certiorari review in the
United States Supreme Court.

The decision in Ursery makes clear

that the Halper test has not been changed and was not altered by
Austin or any other decision.

The continued validity of the

Halper test is best shown by the recent decision of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. McClinton, 98 F.3d
1199 (9th Cir. 1996).
In Ursery the Court took pains to point out
that we cannot mix and match bits and pieces
of the three cases. It said that Halper was
a fixed-penalty case and its "narrow focus"
was limited to that kind of situation.
Austin, it said, was an excessive fines
Eighth Amendment case whose "categorical
approach" was wholly distinct from the Halper
approach. And Kurth Ranch was a tax case for
which the analysis was, again, quite distinct
from that of Halper. Thus, to conflate the
analyses contained in these three disparate
cases is to misread them. In short, neither
Austin nor Kurth Ranch undermines HelperId. at 1202.
Defendant errs when he seeks to import various other tests
into this action.

The only test that this Court should use in

determining whether the monetary sanction imposed at a prison
disciplinary constitutes punishment is that set out in Halper.
If the sanction is rationally related to the remedial purpose of

16

making the government whole for the loss and expense it has been
put to, then the sanction is not punitive and no double jeopardy
bar attaches to the civil proceeding.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the trial court's order
denying Mendoza's motion to dismiss should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND A PUBLISHED OPINION
REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
The State of Utah requests oral argument and a published
opinion in this matter.

The question of whether the imposition

of restitution (or a "fine") by the Utah State Department of
Corrections constitutes punishment should be clearly established
under Utah, and federal, law and resolved by this Court.
Respectfully submitted this

/V

day of December, 1996.

<£?
BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of
the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee State of Utah, postage

J/
prepaid, to the following on this the

/& " ^ day of December,

1996:

Joan C. Watt
Janet Miller
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM A

Frank D. Mylar (5116)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants
330 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 575-1600
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH# SANDY DIVISION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

v.
EDGARDO MENDOZA,

Case No. 941000329 MS

Defendant.

Judge Livingston

This matter comes before this court on Defendant's motion to
dismiss on the grounds that he is being subjected to multiple
punishments in violation of the double jeopardy clauses of the
United States and Utah Constitutions.

Specifically Defendant

claims he was "punished" within the meaning of double jeopardy
following an administrative disciplinary hearing at the Utah State
Prison.
was

The Defendant was represented by Janet Miller, the State

represented

by District Attorney Neal Gunnarson, Deputy

District Attorney Blake Nakamura# and Assistant Attorney General,
Frank D. Mylar, representing the Utah Department of Corrections
(UDC) .
After reviewing memoranda submitted by all parties, the
affidavit of Terry Bartlett, Director of Institutional Operations

for the UDC, and hearing oral argument of the parties, the court
now enters

the following findings of fact and conclusion of laws:

FINDINGS OP FACT
1.

On about August 7, ,1994, Defendant allegedly assaulted a

Utah State Prison correctional officer with bodily fluids.
2.

After an administrative disciplinary hearing at the

prison, Defendant was found in violation of prison rules and fined
$200.00 and restricted to his cell for 30 days.
3.

As a separate and unrelated proceeding, Defendant is

currently being prosecuted in this criminal court for Assault on a
Correctional Officer, a Class A Misdemeanor, arising out of the
same alleged assault of August 7, 1994.
4.

Prison

officials

discipline

inmates

to

assist

in

rehabilitation and to maintain a safe, secure, and orderly managed
institution.
5.

(See Affidavit of Terry Bartlett, 1 2) .

The disciplinary process at the Utah State Prison is

essential to assist prison officials in managing the behavior of
convicted felons by determining whether prison rules are broken.
If rules are broken, the prison uses this information to assess the
inmate's

security

classification

and

rehabilitative

needs.

(Affidavit of Bartlett, f 3 ) .
6.

Fines

that

are

assessed

following

a

disciplinary

conviction are no more than $200.00 and go towards reimbursing the
prison the costs of the hearing, including investigation costs when
2

applicable.

Additional monetary amounts may be charged to the

inmate to reimburse the prison for property damage or related
costs.
7.

(Affidavit of Bartlett, 1 4) .
Monetary

judgments

and

fines, as well

as punitive

isolation (i.e. restrictions from privileges through confinement in
onefs cell), also serve to encourage proper inmate behavior and
rehabilitate the inmate.
8.

(Affidavit of Bartlett, 1 5) .

The disciplinary hearing process at the Utah State Prison

is a civil administrative process and not criminal in nature.
9.

The administrative discipline received by Defendant of 30

days of restriction to his cell and a fine of $200.00 was not
"grossly disproportionate to the prison's remedial goals."

CONCLUSIONS OF IAW
Based upon the above findings of fact, the court now enters
the following conclusions of law:
1.

The administrative discipline received by Defendant of 30

days of restriction to his cell and a fine of $200.00 was not
"punishment" within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause of the
United States or Utah constitutions.
2.

The

Defendant

is not

being

subjected

to "multiple

punishments."
3.

The Defendant is not being subjected to double jeopardy.
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GEEEB
Based upon the above findings of- fact and conclusions of law,
the court now makes the following ORDER:
Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.

DATED this

day of

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on April 19, 1995, I caused to be mailed,
postage prepaid, an exact copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss to:
Janet Miller
Elizabeth Bowman
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Blake Nakamura
Deputy District Attorney
E. Neal Gunnarson
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
2001 South State Street, S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1210
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